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Cof-porate boards are widely perceived as having e:\.l'erienced a
severe liability insurance crisis. After several years of e:\.l'anding
coverage and falling prices, starting in late 1984- the market for
directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance changed dramati-
caJ.1y: premiums skyrocketed, deductibles increased, and coverage
was reduced. 1 There are reports of directors resigning because their
firms had lost insurance coverage and of individuals declining in-
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1. The only data source on directors' and officers' liability insurance is the
biannual survey of business organizations published by the Wyatt Company. Its
1985 survey reported for the first quaner of 1985 a premium increase in 93% of
D&O policy renewals, for an average premium increase of approximately 190%,
and an increase in the corporate deductible in 61 % of renewals, for an average
deductible increase of about 296%. The Wyatt Co., 1985 Wyatt Directors and
Officers Liability Insurance Survey 5 (1985). Of the renewals, 17% el\-perienced
coverage reductions and 23% obtained an increase in coverage, with a net reduction
in policy limits of 3.5%. In addition, e.xcess capacity levels had even larger premium
increases over 1984 levels. !d.
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vitations to serve on boards in increasing numbers.2 In accord with
the reported anecdotes is a reversal of a two-decade trend in board
composition, as the proportion of outside directors, individuals not
employed by the corporation, decreased.3 Management's perception
of an insurance problem is further evident in the shift in reasons
firms provide for not carrying D&O insurance. In 1984, the most
frequently stated reason for not purchasing such insurance was that
there was no need for it, whereas in 1987 the main reason was
affordability.4
The turbulent conditions in the D&O insurance market persisted
until mid-1986, when the rate of cost escalation and capacity reduction
declined. While many corporations reported having difficulty in se-
curing D&O insurance coverage in 1986, only a small number failed
to resolve the problem.5 The increased capacity in D&O insurance
appears to be due, in part, to the emergence of new institutions,
policyholder-formed insurers. In 1986, new policyholder-formed in-
surers accounted for approximately half of all premiums in the excess
D&O insurance market and over one-quarter of the premiums in
the primary market. 6
This article attempts to explain what went wrong in the D&O
insurance market. As will be evident, the conclusions are at times
tentative, and there are a number of important loose ends. This is
because data are quite limited, for D&O liability insurance is not a
separate line item. In addition, although there is a superb literature
on the tort liability crisis,7 little serious attention has been directed
to D&O insurance in particular. Further, the analyses of the tort
literature are not always applicable in the D&O context. These
difficulties are compounded by the fact that the economics of crucial
aspects of the insurance market, such as the working of the insurance
2. E.g., Lewin, Director Insurance Drying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at
D1, col. 2; Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. Wk., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56; Bennett,
Losing Ground? Survey Firms Report Fewer Women Directors, Wall St. J., July 17, 1987,
at 21, col. 4.
3. Baum, supra note 2, at 57.
4. The Wyatt Co., 1987 Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability Insurance
Survey 55 (1987); The Wyatt Co., 1984 Wyatt Directors and Officers and Fiduciary
Liability Survey, Comprehensive Report (1984).
5. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 161.
6. See id. at 105-08.
7. E.g., Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE
L.]. 1521 (1987); Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North
American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 929 (1987).
HeinOnline -- 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 3 1989
1989] DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 3
cycle and the drying up of reinsurance in the recent crisis, are only
dimly- understood.
The article begins with a sketch of the changing patterns in
liability claims against directors8 and in D&O liability insurance
policy provisions, in order to convey some understanding of the
dimensions of the problem. It then examines three institutional factors
that became of increasing importance in the 1980s and caused or
contributed to the crisis: (1) the relationship between general eco-
nomic conditions and the risk of directors' liability, (2) the D&O
insurance market structure, and (3) the features of the legal system
that generate uncertainty in the market for D&O insurance. The
policy recommendation is prosaic though important: courts ought to
refrain from rewriting D&O insurance contracts. Court decisions in
this area have not only often been lawless, but they have also had
perverse effects. For although much of what has been termed a
"crisis" is simply the ordinary operation of market forces, judicial
decisions have unwittingly created impediments to agreement by the
parties to a D&O liability insurance contract.
II. THE EXTENT OF THE CRISIS
A. Trends in Claims Against Directors
Directors and officers of for-profit corporations face nyo types
of claimants: shareholders who sue either on behalf of the corporation,
referred to as a derivative suit, or in their own right; and third
parties, such as the corporation's employees, creditors, suppliers. and
customers, or government agencies. Directors and officers are liable
to shareholders for breaches of their fiduciary duty. This duty has
two components: the duty of care, which guards against negligent
decisions, and the duty of loyalty, which prohibits certain self-in-
terested transactions. By contrast, in the third party litigation cont~"t,
the corporation is frequendy also a defendant, and there is no conflict
benveen the firm, or its shareholders, and the individual defendants.
Given this difference in defense posture, state indemnification
statutes typically differentiate benveen third party actions and share-
8. The article will refer to "directors" rather than "directors and officers."
largely for convenience, but also because the impact of the insurance crisis has
been more severe for directors. given that they bear. for the most part. the same
risk as officers yet receive far less compensation.
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holder derivative suits: in the former category amounts paid in
settlements or judgments are reimbursable, while in the latter category
indemnification is limited to expenses. 9 From the shareholder's per-
spective, there are two standard reasons for directors' indemnification:
(1) to ensure that the ablest individuals are employed as directors,
since the compensation of a director is small relative to the liability
risk; and (2) to ensure that directors take the desired level of risk,
as they might otherwise be too cautious for fear of the potential
liability for a decision that proves harmful with hindsight. 1o The
difference in indemnification treatment provides a powerful incentive
for managers to have their firms purchase D&O insurance because
the same state corporation codes that impose limits on direct indem-
nification permit corporations to purchase liability insurance for their
directors and officers, which compensates them whether or not they
can be indemnified for the loss. II There are two other potential
situations in which insurance is desirable. First, the firm may be
unable (as in the case of an insolvent corporation) to provide in-
demnity. Second, the firm may be unwilling (as in the case of a
corporation that has experienced a change in control) to indemnify
its directors and officers. The availability of insurance need not lead
to an increased level of misconduct: in a competitive insurance
market, even if insurers cannot monitor insureds perfectly, they can
adjust insurance contract terms and offer partial insurance to mitigate
the moral hazard of insurance inducing suboptimal levels of care by
insureds. 12
D&O insurance was introduced in the aftermath of the stock
market crash and the enactment of the federal securities laws in the
1930s, in order to protect directors against liability from shareholder
suits, when statutory indemnification rights were less express or
expansive than under current law. While shareholder claims constitute
the largest category of claims against directors, they comprise less
than 40 % of all claims according to the Wyatt Company Survey
(Wyatt Survey), the principal source of information concerning D&O
9. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) & (b) (1987). In the wake of the
recent insurance crisis, some states have done away with the statutory distinction.
E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355.2 (Vernon 1988).
to. See Conard, A Behavioral Anarysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972
DUKE L.]. 895, 898-900.
11. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1987).
12. See generalry Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL]. ECON. 120 (1982).
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claims and insurance. 13 The second largest category of claimants,
employees, has been increasing over time. This category represented
26% of all 1986 claims, compared to a historic average of 16%. A
further recent change is that the proportion of claims frIed by cus-
tomers has almost doubled, with an offsetting decline in the per-
centage of claims by prior owners of acquired companies. It is possible
that the explosion in regulation in areas outside of shareholder-
manager relations is having a significant spillover, in the form of
the increasing number of nonshareholder claims, upon an insurance
policy conceived to address different problems. But it is also possible
that these claims do not involve rights under new legal rules and
come up under conventional legal doctrines such as fraud. It
The Wyatt Survey groups claims frIed against directors and
officers into a large number of categories, such as misleading re-
presentations, breaches of employment contracts and duties to mi-
nority shareholders, civil rights violations, fraud and antitrust
violations. A substantial number of the claims are not, however,
classified because they constitute unique types of allegations. There-
fore, in the 1987 Wyatt Survey, while there are seventeen separate
categories of allegations against directors of nonbank corporations,
17.1 % of the allegations still could not be classified. l$ In addition,
when claims are grouped according to the circumstances surrounding
the allegations, such as impaired employee relationship, acquisition
of another company, entering into a contract and going private, the
Wyatt Survey could not classify 16.7% of the allegations, despite
twenty-seven specified categories of circumstances. 16 For both types
of claim classification, type of allegation and circumstances surround-
ing an allegation, the number and proportion of claims not susceptible
13. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 28. The range from the 1974-1987
surveys is 35-42%, with an average close to 39%. Because the surveys include
some corporations that have no shareholders, such as mutual companies, the per-
centage of shareholder claims for companies with shareholders is understated. The
figures on shareholder claims can be adjusted to eliminate from the base claims
filed a~st nonpublic corporations, which include mutuals. The range of the
proportion of shareholder claims so adjusted is 41-50% and the average is 45%.
But the adjusted figures overstate the proportion of shareholder claims because the
corporations in the largest group of nonpublic corporations, closely-held farms, have
shareholders, and thus some of the claims excluded from the base may have been
brought by shareholders.
14. The Wyatt Surveys do not cross-tabulate information concerning the
content of claims with the identity of the claimants.
15. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 3l.
16. [d. at 36. The percentages for banks arc even higher.
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to classification increased from 1984 to 1987Y The large number
of unclassified claims is most likely a testament to creative lawyering.
If, however, unclassifiable claims are viewed as an index of unex·
pected claims because they are unique claims, then their increasing
number over the past few years suggests a source of the insurance
crisis-increased difficulty in assessing D&O liability risks and there-
fore difficulty in the pricing of policies, which at a minimum, would
raise premiums. 18
In all likelihood, however, the most important impetus for the
recent ratchet in D&O insurance premiums is the sheer increase in
the number of claims flled against directors. According to one ac-
count, the number of suits flled against directors in 1985 increased
fourfold over 1984. 19 From 1974 to 1984, the number of companies
reporting in the Wyatt Survey that they had experienced a liability
claim against a director more than doubled, from 7% to 18% of
those surveyed.20
The Wyatt Survey charts the increase in the number of claims
by two measures, "claim susceptibility," which is defined as "the
probability of a corporation having one or more claims against it in
the nine-year experience period" consisting of the nine years pre-
ceding the year of the survey, and "claim frequency," which is
defined as "the total number of claims per (participating firm) during
(that) nine-year interval. "21 These measures are specially tracked for
the largest firms in the survey, those listed in Fortune magazine's
top 1000 firms. As the following data indicate, while claim suscep-
17. The 1984 percentages of nonclassifiable claims were 13.9% (nature of
allegation) and 12.7% (circumstances surrounding allegations). /d. at 31, 36. In
earlier surveys, the percentage of unclassified claims was occasionally higher than
the 1987 percentage. Because those surveys also had fewer specified categories of
claims, it is probable that what were then novel, and hence unique claims, have
now become common enough to form additional separate claim classes.
18. Any relation between unclassified claims and the insurance crisis depends
on what precisely D&O actuaries consider: in particular, the significance of the
claims and whether they occur randomly across firms.
19. Andrews, Keeping Directors Aboard, Venture, June 1986, at 36, 37.
20. See 1984 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 22; The Wyatt Co., Wyatt
Directors and Officers Liability Survey, at 7.
21. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 11. The figures are adjusted for
selection bias among the respondents based upon the first survey year's results.
Firms are apparently reluctant to report large claims, and poorly performing firms,
which are frequently litigation targets, respond to the survey with less frequency
than profitable firms. !d.
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tibility for this group has steadily increased, claim frequency has



















This means that, on the basis of the 1986 data which are derived
from claims that were fIled in 1977-1985, the probability of a Fortune
1000 company's directors' being sued during the past nine years has
been slighdy more than 40%. Furthermore, for every ten Fortune
1000 corporations, slighdy more than nine claims against directors
have been fIled over those nine years. The Wyatt Survey goes on
to project that one in fIve Fortune 1000 fIrms will experience a D&O
claim in 1987.23 Because of inherent problems in the survey data
from which D&O claim information is derived, estimating the rate
of increase in claim frequency is difficult; the best guess based on
the 1986 data is an annual increase for all fIrms in the range of
10% to 25%.24
Of equal or greater concern to insurers as the increase in claims,
is the escalation in claim costs. While less than half the claims against
directors are closed with a payment made to the claimant, the number
of claims closing with a payment in excess of $1 million has increased.
This has led the Wyatt Survey to conclude that settlement payments
are rising over time, while the number of claims closed with no
payment has remained fairly constant.25 An additional factor bearing
on the cost spiral may be the increasing use of the civil remedies
provision of RICO, the federal Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act, against directors for fraud. RICO permits plaintiffs
to recover treble damages as well as attorneys' fees.26
22. ld. at 12. The same trend appears in the earlier Wyatt Surve)'s, which
are not fully comparable as they were based on six-year periods. &e The \Vyatt
Co., 1976 Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability and Fiduciary Liability Survey,
Complete Report 12 (1976) (comparable data for 1974-, 1975, and 1976 surveys).
23. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 12.
24. ld. at 13. Besides the sdection problems mentioned earlier, supra note
17, it is possible that respondents are less likdy to remember older claims.
25. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 15-16.
26. lchel, DirectrJrs' and OlfUers' Insurance Corerage: An Oren;itw and CUTTenl
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The average cost of paid claims in the Wyatt Surveys, excluding
legal fees, was $1,988,200 in 1986, up from $1,306,OQO in 1984 and
$877 ,361 in 1980.21 The increase is still striking when the figures
are deflated to 1967 dollars: average claim costs went up more than
50 % .28 As insurers project future losses from present claims, an
increase in payouts automatically raises the expected value of future
claims, which in turn raises the price of insurance.
Even when there is no payout to a claimant, D&O insurance
pays for directors' and officers' legal defense. While the data are
sketchy, so that all figures are really best guesstimates, these ex-
penditures have clearly risen. Average defense costs in 1986 were
estimated at $592,000, up from $461,000 in 1984, $318,255 in 1980
and $181,508 in 1974.29 Again, adjusting for inflation mitigates, but
does not eliminate, the increase: when these figures are deflated to
1967 dollars, there is still a sizeable 35 % rise. 30 Because legal fees
have outpaced inflation, a comprehensive explanation of the insurance
i 1
Problems, reprinted in DrREcToRS' AND OFFICERS' LIABJLlTY INSURANCE AND SELF
INSURANCE 29, 73 (1986). The actual impact on settlement and litigation expenses
of adding RICO charges is, unfortunately, unknown.
27. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 19; 1984 Wyatt Survey, S/lpra note
4, at 31; The Wyatt Co., 1980 Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability and Fiduciary
Liability Survey, Report on U.S. Corporations 27 (1980). Average tOtal claim CO$ts
of all claims, including those with no payment and excluding d,efense costs, increased
from $340,018 in 1980, to $583,000 in 1984, to $880,800 in 1986.
28. The Wyatt Survey does not adjust its figures for the effect of ipflation.
The deflated costs, using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), which tiikes' 1967 as
the base year, as reported in the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers
to the President (1987), are $617,070 in 1986, up from $437,668 in 1984 and
$403,570 in 1980. I used the CPI for the year prior to the stated year, because
that is the final year of claims contained in each survey. That is, 1986 costs were
deflated by the 1985 CPI. Even these adjustments are inaccurate and overstate the
increase because each Wyatt Survey year's costs contain costs paid on claims over
a nine-year interval. The figures cannot be further disaggregated to adjust or weight
the deflator because surveyed firms are not asked to indicate the year of the payments.
Average total claim costs including claims closed with no payment but excluding
defense costs, when similarly adjusted for inflation, increased by 75% from 1980
to 1986.
29. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 15. These estimates include the costs
of open claims. The average cost of all closed claims, however, is less; for example,
for 1986 it is S338,000. /d. at H.
30. The deflated figures are $183,737 in 1986, up from $154,491 in 1984,
$146,391 in 1980 and $136,370 in 1974. The increase during the 1980s was therefore
26%. See 1987 Annual Report, supra note 28. Because the Wyatt figures average
claim costs over riine-year intervals, even these deflated figures may overstate the
increase.
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crisis will require a more complete understanding of the market for
legal services.31
The upward trend in liability costs is magnified for the largest
category of claims, shareholder suits. Although 74% of shareholder
clairp.s, an above average proportion for claims against directors, are
settled without payment to the claimant, the percentage of shareholder
claims with awards over $500,000, $1,000,000, and $5,000,000 is
greater than that of other claimants.32 In addition, the costs of
defending shareholder suits have not only increased over time,33 but
they also are consistently above the average defense costs of claims
against directors.3+ While employee suits have become more preva-
lent, the damages sought and received in such cases, as well as the
costs of defending them, are considerably below average. Hence,
where personal liability is involved, the single greatest fear of boards
is still a shareholder suit.
B. Trends in D&O Policy Forms
D&O policies consist of two parts, a "Company Reimburse-
ment" portion, that reimburses the corporation for legally valid
indemnification payments made to directors and officers for covered
losses, ~d a "Directors and Officers Liability" part, that provides
personal coverage, reimbursing the individual directors and officers
for unindemnified payments. Because most claims come under the
corporate reimbursement portion, as claims have increased, corporate
reimbursement deductibles have risen over time while personal cov-
erage deductibles have not.3S Corporate deductibles surged upwards
recently, for an average increase of 1,326% from 1984 to 1987.36
Personal coverage deductibles, after declining steadily for a decade,
31. See Trebilcock, supra note 7, at 941 (excellent discussion of wh)' it is
unlikely that an increase in the number of attorneys is a source of the increase in
the number of tort claims).
32. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 29. The damages alleged b)' share-
holder claimants are also, on average, higher than those of other claimants.
33. For example, average legal fees per claim with shareholder claimants
increased from $397,060 in the nine-year period covered by the 1984 Wyatt Sun.·ey
to $513,409 in the nine-year period covered by the 1987 Wyatt Sun.·ey. /d. at 30;
1984 Wyatt Survey, sv.pra note 4, at 55. Adjusted for inflation, the increase over
the two surveys is 20%.
34. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 30 ($513,409 compared to average
legal fees per claim of $281,684).
35. !d. at 76.
36. Id. at 75.
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have also begun to drift upward, increasing an average of 44% from
1984 to 1987, although the deductible amount is still lower than it
was in the 1970s.37 It might appear that individual insureds should
favor this trend in deductibles because, unlike the corporate de-
ductible, the personal deductible comes directly from their pockets.
This is so because firms do not-and in some cases, given mandatory
indemnification statutes, cannot-reduce the amount paid in indem-
nification by the amount of the corporate deductible. But this os-
tensible benefit may be more apparent than real. Organizations have
many options with which to affect their members' behavior. Just as
organizations can increase an individual's income, in visible and less
visible ways, to cover the cost of paying the personal deductible,
they can also reduce an individual's income to compensate the entity
for having paid the corporate deductible. 38
Concurrent with the rise in policy deductibles, premiums have
gone up, reversing a downward trend of several years. Over 80 %
of firms renewing policies from mid-1985 through 1986 experienced
a premium increase, and over half reported an increase in excess of
200 % .39 Of course, the effective rate of premium increase is far
greater than this, because new policies have higher deductibles and
provide less coverage. Taking 1974 as a premium index base year
equaling 100%, the Wyatt Survey computes an index that incor-
porates deductible levels as well as other factors, such as policy limit
and corporate asset size, in determining the premium. Based on this
calculation, the average premium index for 1987 was 682.4 %, in
contrast to a 1984 average of 54.3%.40
Coverage has also been restricted by adding exclusions and
revising coverage extension provisions. While there have always been
exclusions in D&O policies, such as exclusions for losses caused by
dishonesty or personal profit, which mitigate obvious moral hazard
concerns, the proportion of policies with exclusions, as well as the
number of exclusions per policy, have sharply increased. In partic-
ular, traditional exclusions, such as exclusions for losses due to
pollution, pending and prior litigation, and failure to maintain in-
surance, were reported as included in D&O policies in 1987 at a
37. [d. at 75-76.
38. See generally Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise
and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345 (1982) (discussing choice
between enterprise and agent liability).
39. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 89.
40. [d. at 90-91.
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rate approximately double their reported inclusion in policies in effect
in 1984.41 In addition, the newer exclusions for losses due to litigation
by an insured against another insured, mergers and acquisitions,
tender offer resistance, actions by regulatory agencies, and securities
transactions appeared in more than 10% of D&O policies in 1986.42
While some of the exclusions, such as the pollution exclusion, are
relatively innocuous as they prevent D&O policies from being used
as umbrella or substitute general liability policies, others, such as
the acquisitions and takeover resistance exclusions, undercut the very
rationale for acquiring D&O insurance as they eliminate from cov-
erage shareholder claims that have been a traditional impetus for
purchasing insurance.
A further method of restricting coverage, besides the addition
of specific exclusions, is reducing the policy's duration. There are
two key provisions involving coverage duration in the standard D&O
policy: insurer cancellation and extended discovery or extended re-
porting period clauses. Cancellation provisions, which give the insurer
the right to cancel the policy after a specified advance notice period,
have not been used in a serious way to limit coverage in the recent
crisis. This is reflected in the fact that the percentage of new policies
with shorter cancellation notice periods-primarily a period of less
than 45 days-is imperceptibly higher than the proportion in the
past.43 Rather, significant reductions in coverage have occurred with
regard to extended discovery provisions.
Extended discovery provisions extend the period of coverage
during which the insured can report claims to the insurer concerning
wrongful acts committed during the original policy period, for pay-
ment of an additional premium. These provisions can be crucial for
the insured because D&O policies are written on a claims-made basis,
in contrast to the occurrence basis of general liability policies.44 As
these provisions often come into play when the insurer has exercised
its cancellation right, they protect the insured against a potential gap
in coverage that could not arise under an occurrence policy-a
41. ld. at 68.
42. ld. at 68-69, 73-74.
43. ld. at 67, 70.
44. A claims-made policy covers losses for claims that are filed against the
insured during the policy period, whereas occurrence insurance covers losses arising
out of acts occurring during the policy period even if the policy has C>.-pired when
the claim is brought. Extended discovery period provisions, thus, move a claims-
made policy in the direction of an occurrence policy.
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wrongful act occurring during the policy period with no claim having
been filed before the policy is terminated.
During the recent crisis, the number of policies with shorter
extended discovery periods has been increasing. For instance, 41.2%
of new policies had a one-year extended discovery period compared
to 56.5% of old policies, while 41.1 % of new policies had a 90-day
period compared to 29.9% of old policiesY This particular revision
is a significant loss of protection for insureds because insurers fre-
quently cancel policies when a claim appears likely. For instance,
one-third of directors who submitted D&O insurance claims reported
that the insurer tried to cancel the policy or narrow its coverage. 46
Cancellation under these circumstances creates severe problems for
an insured, as a new policy application asks whether the insured
knows of any past acts that could produce a claim and then will
typically exclude losses from any acts so disclosedY
The final important change in D&O policies during the current
crisis is a sharp reduction in policy limits. From early 1985 to mid-
1986, an increasing number of companies found their D&O policies
renewable only at substantially lower levels of coverage, despite
premium and deductible increases. The Wyatt Survey reported an
average decrease in policy limits of 50 % in the first quarter of 1986. 48
45. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 71.
46. Scheibla, A Plague ofLawyers, Barron's, Nov. 17, 1986, at 38. For examples
of particular D&O policy cancellations or attempts to narrow coverage as claims
became likely, see Fletcher, AIG Unit disputes coverage for Seafirst D&O settlement, Bus.
Ins., July 14, 1986, at 2; Taravella, Insurer sues to void D&O cover of firm facing
shareholder suit, Bus. Ins., Apr. 22, 1985, at 2; Victor, D&O Canceled and Unocal
Sues, Legal Times, July 29, 1985, at 1.
47. Although in the early 1980s competition for accounts led new entrants
to adopt a continuity policy that did not require a new disclosure statement with
a switching firm's application, it is inconceivable that the issuer of a new policy
in today's circumstances will insure the anticipated loss or not raise charges ac-
cordingly. Rundle, Coverage continuiry beckons D&O buyer, Bus. Ins., Dec. 29, 1980,
at 1. For example, Unocal Corp., whose insurance was cancelled when it became
a takeover target, was able to replace its cancelIed policies but at a substantial cost:
(1) payment of a forty-fold increase in the premium; (2) payment of a $13,000,000
loss reserve to the new insurers (the unused portion to be returned to Unocal);
and (3) a promise to indemnify fulIy the new excess insurer for any claims it paid
out under the policy. Third Amended Complaint for Unocal Corp., Unocal Corp.
v. Harbor Insurance Co., No. C-550-393 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 2, 1986), reprinted
in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 1987, at 319, 324 (1987). When
it cancelled the policy, the primary insurer simultaneously offered Unocal a new
policy which would not cover losses arising from one of the anticipated events,
board resistance to a takeover, for a thirty-fold increase in the premium. !d.
48. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 57.
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Virtually all insurers remaining in the market cut back their capacity
from 1984 to 1986.49 By the end of 1986, however, the situation
improved somewhat, as newly organized policyholder-formed insur-
ance groups offered increased limits for their members. As a result,
there was a net reduction in policy limits of only 10% in the last
quarter of 1986 and, on average, the limits were higher than pre-
1984 levels.5o
III. CAUSES OF THE CRISIS
A. Business Conditions and D&O Liability Risks
Business conditions can contribute to the insurance crisis by
altering the underlying risk of loss. In particular, the economic
environment can encourage transactions or create situations that
breed litigation. Conditions in the 1980s were conducive to three
major categories of events that have a high correlation with share-
holder suits, and hence may partially explain the increase in the
number of claims fIled against directors: acquisitions, initial public
offerings, and bankruptcies.
(1) Merger and acquisition activity appears to occur in waves
that crest with buoyant stock prices. 51 The 1980s witnessed one of
the largest waves of acquisitions yet, as new financing techniques
left no firm too big for a takeover, and revised antitrust merger
guidelines adjusted the market share defmition, which expanded the
number of permissible corporate marriages. A view shared by the
bar and the press is that this merger boom is a primaI'}' cause of
the D&O insurance crisis.52 This is because acquisition activities
frequendy spawn lawsuits against directors by shareholders objecting
49. /d. at 167-74; Brown, Statutory Formal ofD&O Courage-Dual Policy Structure
and Relationship to Corporate Indemnification, THE CRISIS IN DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS'
LIABILITY INSURANCE 77, 79 (1986).
50. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 57. The higher polic)' limits were
more adversely affected; while in 1984, 1\"'0 respondents indicated limits of over
S215 million, in 1987, the highest reported limit was S141 million. /d. at 59.
51. E.g., R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCtPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 722
(2d ed. 1984).
52. E.g., Maher, MGIC Indemnity Expanding D&O HoriuJns, Nat'l Underwriter
(Life ed.), Nov. 28, 1981, at 2, 17; Lerach & Weiss, SmuititS Class Actions and
Derivative Litigations Involving Public Compania: A Pmintiff's Persputire on tn! Suppostd
Crisis in Directors' and Olficers' Liability Insuranu, THE CRISIS IN DIRECTORS' AND
OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 208 (1986).
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to the terms of the deal, the disclosure surrounding the deal, or
defensive tactics used to thwart the deal. The behavior of insurers
lends some support to the contention; applications for insurance
inquire into past and future acquisition activity and often carve out
exclusions for losses due to acquisitions. Exclusions for resistance to
takeovers have been increasingly demanded on renewals, and policies
of insureds that become targets have been cancelled. In addition,
the leading judicial decisions in corporate law during the 1980s have
involved acquisition battles.53
(2) The strong stock market of the 1980s prompted a flurry
of public offerings, particularly in the high technology industry.
Lawsuits follow if the price of a new issue drops, as investors try
to recoup their losses with the aid of the federal securities laws. One
commentator attributes the substantial increase in shareholder liti-
gation in 1985 over 1984 to souring public offerings.54 Like an increase
in merger and acquisition activity, an increase in the pace of initial
public offerings can alter the distribution of losses and, therefore,
can have some impact on D&O insurance rates.
(3) The final important environmental condition spurring
litigation in the 1980s is more immediately related to economic
performance. Over the past several years, there has been a rash of
business failures, primarily among oil companies and banks, espe-
cially banks with a high proportion of energy loans in their portfolio.
The increasing number of bankruptcies is of concern to D&O insurers
because directors and officers of bankrupt firms are often sued by
bankruptcy trustees and shareholders in an attempt to locate cash.
Moreover, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company has been suing
bank directors to tap the failed institutions' D&O insurance. The
litigation-prone condition of an insolvent entity explains why the
most desirable risk is said to be a company "in sound financial
condition with a good earnings record.' '55 Insurance applications
53. For example, over half of the cases in the most recent supplements to
corporate law casebooks involve acquisition transactions. E.g., W. CARY & M.
EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. Supp. 1987); L. SOLOMON,
D. SCHWARTZ & ]. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS (Supp. 1986). Because the Wyatt Survey only began classifying claims
by circumstances in 1980, those data cannot be used to trace whether claims involving
acquisitions, public offerings, or bankruptcies have increased in the 1980s.
54. Andrews, supra note 19, at 37 (discussing how high-tech companies enjoyed
a boom of hot issues but then suffered through a bust and several lawsuits).
55. Hinsey, Delancey, Stahl & Kramer, What Existing D&O Policies Cover, 27
Bus. Law. 147, 155 (1972) (comments of Vincent Stahl).
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require the submission of fmancial statements; rates are correlated
with profitability, as companies .with prior losses pay substantially
higher premiums.56 Although the entire market has been affected,
banks have experienced particular difficulty in obtaining D&O in-
surance during the recent crisis.57
By changing the distribution of D&O liability risk, business
conditions in the 1980s can explain some aspects of the D&O in-
surance crIsis, especially the large premium increases. However, they
do not provide a complete explanation because they do not C'\.-plain
capacity constraints and the exit of insurers from the market. This
is because product withdrawal suggests that risks are perceived to
be uninsurable. Losses from a rising number of bankruptcies, ac-
quisitions, or public offerings are, however, within the realm of the
predictable and can be handled by rate adjustments. Moreover, since
some of the environmental factors increasing the number of lawsuits
have an important industry-specific component, it is puzzling that
the crisis has been felt so widely across the market. However, to the
extent that all firms are affected by these factors, the increased liability
risks will not be independent. A dependency in insureds' losses
disrupts insurance markets because the law of large numbers will no
longer apply for pricing risks, so that premiums will be greater than
expected losses.58
B. Market Structure Considerations
One explanation for rising premiums and capacity restrictions
that has been offered in the literature on the general liability insurance
crisis is collusion among insurers. Conspiracy theories have been
especially popular because the insurance industry is exempt from
antitrust laws. Although in the early 1960s Lloyd's of London pro-
vided the only market for D&O insurance, the line is more com-
petitive now. Nevertheless, D&O insurance is still a highly specialized
product offered by a limited number of companies in comparison to
56. E.g., 1980 Wyatt Survey, supra note 27, at 63-64.
57. Jennings, D&O Market Dries Up for Bankers, Nat'} Underwriter (property
& casualty insurance cd.), Aug. 15, 1986, at 4; Schares, Banking: Diratort Resigning
Over Lost Insurance, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 9, 1985, at 23, col. 8.
58. But if. R. Winter, "Crises" in Competitire Insurana Markels, Hoover Inst.
of Stan. U. Working Papers in Econ., No. E-86-U, at 4 (Dec. 1986) (arguing
dependent risks, that is, nondiversiflability in the insurance market, should not
matter in a stock market economy because insurers could diversify those risks in
the capital market).
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other insurance lines. The most recent Wyatt Survey identified less
than fifty providers, and their capacity and activity in the market
vary greatly. Tallies of the major active D&O insurers range between
six and eighteen.59
Some sense of the concentration in the D&O insurance industry,
hence the potential for collusion, can be derived from the Wyatt
Survey data on market shares. I computed several estimates of the
primary concentration measures (the Herfindahl-Hirschman indexGO
and four- and eight-firm concentration ratios) by using two com-
putations of market share (number of policies written and premium
dollar volume) and two separate markets (primary and excess in-
surance). The industry's Herfindahl-Hirschman index is generally
quite low, ranging from 900 for excess insurance by number of
accounts to 1600 for primary insurance by number of accounts, 1100
for excess insurance by premium volume and 2500 for primary
insurance by premium volume. Under the Justice Department's
revised merger guidelines such a market is on average in the clas-
sification of moderately concentrated.61 This suggests that collusion
is unlikely. However, the four-firm concentration ratios are high,
ranging between 52 % for excess insurance by number of accounts,
70 % for primary insurance by number of accounts, 59 % for eXCess
insurance by premium volume, and 85 % for primary insurance by
premium volume. 62 These estimates are not inconsistent: the market
59. Brown, supra note 49, at 79 (nine principal companies); Goldwasser,
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance: An Overview, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS'
LIABILITY INSURANCE AND SELF INSURANCE II, 15 (1986) (only six companies offering
coverage on general basis in U.S.); Middleton, A Broker's View of the Directors' and
Officers'Market and Placing Risks, in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE
AND SELF INSURANCE 429, 437-41 (1986) (listing 18 companies).
60. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER"
FORMANCE 56-59 (2d cd. 1980) (discussion of the measure).
61. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed.
Reg. 28,493 (1982), reprinted in 71 CALIF. L. REV. 649, 655-57 (1983) (market with
index under 1000 is unconcentrated, but between 1000 and 1800 is moderately
concentrated).
62. Under the 1968 merger guidelines which looked at market concentration
ratios, four-firm ratios of 75% were frequently a cut-off point under the most
stringent scrutiny, and hence a challenge to mergers. As noted in the new merger
guidelines, a market with a Herfindahl-Hirschman index in the moderately con-
centrated range corresponds to a market with a four-firm concentration ratio of
between 50% and 70%. /d. The eight-firm concentration ratios are 86% for primary
insurance by number of accounts, 75% for excess insurance by number of accounts,
93% for primary insurance by premium volume and 81 % for excess insurance by
premium volume.
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contains several firms with infinitesimal market shares and a few
firms with large, but relatively equal, shares.
Of at least equal importance to share data in assessing com-
petitiveness is the stability of market shares. While concentration
ratios are a static measure of market structure, turnover among top
firms suggests dynamic competition that concentration ratios may
obscure.63 There have been dramatic shifts in D&O insurance market
shares in recent years. Eight insurers that were ranked in the top
ten by number of accounts between 1975-1984 had left the market
by 1985.64 Chubb Group, which is currently the second largest insurer
by number of accounts and third largest by premium volume, was
not present in the D&O market in 1980, and two of the newly
formed policyholder insurers are among the top four fIrmS measured
by premium volume and the top eight firms measured by number
of accounts. In addition, in 1987 two major commercial insurers
began writing D&O insurance. Despite the high concentration ratios,
when the relatively low Herfmdahl-Hirschman index and the fluidity
in entrance, exit and market shares are considered together, the
resulting picture is most consistent with competition.
The data on mobility in market position and concentration
measures for D&O insurance do not indicate the degree of com-
petitiveness of the reinsurance market, although reinsurance is a
critical factor for D&O rates because most D&O insurance is re-
insured. Reinsurers are the traditional source for insurers not only
to spread risk but also to reduce reserve requirements attributable
to new business from the required maintenance of a specified pre-
mium-to-surplus ratio.65 In fact, American competition in D&O in-
surance with the London market was initiated in the 1970s with the
aid of aggressive European reinsurers: reinsurance enabled American
63. SCHERER, supra note 60, at 73-74.
64. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 106.
65. J. ATHEARN & S. PRITCHETI, RISK AND INSURANCE 57-58 (5th ed. 1984).
Insurance companies are required to maintain a specified premium-to-surplus ratio.
This ratio affects the amount of new business that can be written because it requires
an increase in reserves to correspond to additional premiums. E.g., Loomis, Naf.d
Came the 17lSUTance Buyer, Fortune, June 10, 1985, at 68. Issuing a new policy adds
more to liabilities than assets because all the e.xpenses are incurred immediately
while the revenues are spread out as earned. In addition, the reserve requirement
does not make allowance for that practice. Consequently, there is a short-run drain
of surplus which raises the premium-to-surplus ratio and impairs the capital of the
growing firm.
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companies with no D&O claim experience to enter the field and
offer substantial limits, for only modest exposure.66
This linkage of D&O insurance with the reinsurance market
contributed to the D&O crisis. In the mid-1980s, as reinsurers ab-
sorbed substantial losses, the worldwide reinsurance market tightened.
Because D&O reinsurance is facultative, whereby each policy is
separately and specially negotiated with a reinsurer, it is particularly
susceptible to changes in the reinsurance market since the ceding
insurer cannot bind coverage until the reinsurance is arranged. 67
Delay in this costly negotiation process, therefore, disadvantages the
ceding company, while the reinsurer can use this as leverage for
limiting which policies it must accept to retain the business. On their
1985 renewals, American insurers could no longer obtain inexpensive
reinsurance. As a direct consequence, at the same time that they
were forced to retain more units of risk, they reduced their D&O
capacity.
The apparent capacity constraint produced by a reduced avail-
ability of reinsurance is one of the more puzzling aspects of the D&O
insurance crisis. Conventionally, markets are expected to adjust by
changes in a product's price and not its withdrawal. That is, it
would be reasonable to expect that 1984 D&O policies, with their
higher limits, would be available but more expensive in 1986. Yet
in D&O, as well as other professional liability insurance, desired
terms of coverage-and for some firms any coverage-became una-
vailable, at apparently any price.
Given that the input for insurance is wealth and not the physical
capital of a factory which could have productive capacity limits, a
capacity constraint story seems intuitively implausible. For such a
story to be compelling there must be a barrier preventing the entry
of new insurers or reinsurers. Some attribute the capacity problem
to regulation, and in particular, the required premium-to-surplus
ratio. Under this scenario, insurers do not write all the business
demanded and drop the riskier lines, such as D&O, in order to
avoid the required increase in reserves to match the increase in
premiums. But the absence of data on the frequency of firms pushing
up against that constraint68 and the shifting market shares and turn-
66. See, e.g., Middleton, supra note 59, at 431.
67. Webb, Reinsurance as a Social Tool, ISSUES IN INSURANCE 207, 211 (J. Long,
2d ed. 1981).
68. See Priest, supra note 7, at 1531.
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over in the D&O insurance market suggest that there is no such
barrier.
Although it is possible that entry into the D&O reinsurance
market is particularly expensive, it is difficult to imagine what aspect
of the business would create such a bar, especially since reinsurers
are subject to far less regulation than insurers. In markets where a
fIrm's reputation is important, the cost of developing a reputation
creates a barrier to new entrants. While it might appear that insureds
would be concerned about their insurer's solvency so that reputation
would matter, the turnover in D&O market shares suggests that
reputation is not crucial for this market, and there is no powerful
reason for concluding that the reinsurance market is any different.
Indeed, regulation and private rating services reduce entry costs and
make reputations less necessary, in general, for the insurance market.
Furthermore, the purchasers of reinsurance-insurers-are presum-
ably more informed about the product they are purchasing than the
buyers of insurance, which further limits the importance of repu-
tation. Given the fruitlessness of this line of analysis, it is possible
that we are operating under a false impression that there was a
capacity constraint and that, instead, firms were simply unwilling to
pay the higher premiums necessary to induce insurers to supply
coverage.
A market structure explanation of the D&O insurance crisis that
is more plausible than a collusion thesis and is in keeping with the
evidence of easy entry of firms is that the crisis was simply the peak
of a competitive cycle. Insurance cycles have been charted for many
lines, in many countries, and have been thought by some to be the
cause of the general liability insurance crisis.69 According to this
thesis, the D&O cycle started in the late 1970s when prices were
high. This induced new entrants to appear on the scene in the 1980s.
As they competed for business, prices dropped. At the same time,
interest rates were rising so insurers, the theory goes, were willing
to price policies below cost (the expected loss) to obtain more premium
69. See generalb N. Doherty & H. Kang, Price Instabi/i~ Jar a Fi1U1naal Inta-
mediary: Interest Rates and Insurance Price C)'cles, Center for Research on Risk and
Insurance, Wharton School, Univ. of Penn. Working Paper No. 87-1; J. Cummins
& J. Outreville, An Inlernational Anab'sis oj Undmuriting C;'cles in Propat)"Liabili~
Insurance, Center for Research on Risk and Insurance, Wharton School, Univ. of
Penn. Working Paper No. 86-7. See also Priest, supra note 7, at 1529-32 (discussing
Cuomo Commission's report and the general use of cycle theories to explain tort
liability crisis).
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dollars to invest at the higher rates. In 1984, interest rates declined,
and low-premium D&O policies became unprofitable. As a result,
some insurers left the market; those remaining raised their prices.
Hence we have the characteristics defining the crisis-rising prem-
iums and shrinking capacity-and a full cycle defined from peak to
peak. 70 Lured by higher prices, new entrants arrived in late 1986,
and the rate of price increase slowed, presaging the cycle phase of
lower prices.
Cycle explanations typically treat the period of low premiums,
such as 1982-1984 for D&O insurance, as involving a deliberate
underpricing of risks, and the period of higher prices as a realignment
in accord with cost. A cycle explanation also typically assumes that
losses are unaffected when interest rates change: as the insurance
premium equals the discounted value of the expected losses, when
interest rates rise, the premium is lowered, if the expected loss remains
constant. If a significant part of the rise in interest rates is caused
by inflation, then it would follow that losses will increase as well,
and premiums would not decline. But as long as the increase in
expected payout is not identical to the increase in invested earnings,
an inverse relationship between interest rates and premiums will
hold.
Still, casual empiricism suggests that a cycle explanation cannot
explain the full magnitude of D&O premium increases during the
recent crisis. Real interest rates have been at historic highs throughout
the 1980s, including 1984-1985, the years the crisis began, and while
the real rate was lower in 1985 than in 1984, it was also lower in
1983 than in 1982.71 Moreover, payments on D&O claims increased
throughout the 1980s, and they increased faster than did inflation.
Both of these facts are inconsistent with a cycle explanation of D&O
insurance price shifts. In addition, the incentive created by high
interest rates for insurers to lower premiums and to increase accounts
written is more powerful for writers of occurrence, rather than claims-
made, policies. This is because the time between receipt of the
premium and payment of a claim is substantially shorter under a
claims-made than an occurrence policy, and the shorter interval
reduces the investment income that will be earned on the premium
before a claim is paid. In all likelihood, interest rate changes have
70. See Priest, supra note 7, at 1529-30.
71. R. IBBOTSON & G. BRINSON, INVESTMENT MARKETS: GAINING THE PER-
FORMANCE ADVANTAGE 130-32 (1987).
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had some effect on D&O insurance prices since there is still a gap
benveen receipts and payouts under claims-made policies.72 But, given
the high real interest rate throughout the 1980s, it is improbable
that the receipt-payout gap for D&O insurance could be responsible
for the entire reported increase in premiums.
C. Legal Considerations
1. Substantive Corporate Law Doctrine
The most persuasive explanation of the crisis in general liability
insurance emphasizes changes in tort doctrines of liability and damage
recovery.73 Such an explanation is not directly applicable to D&O
insurance, for the substantive doctrine concerning the largest and
most expensive category of D&O claims, shareholder claims, has not
undergone radical expansion or even major change since the 1970s.
Firms began to purchase D&O insurance on a widespread basis
toward the end of the 1960s. The best available data are that in
1965 less than 10% of corporations carried D&O insurance, whereas
by 1971, 70-80% of major corporations purchased it.7• In addition,
the amount of insurance written went from an insignificant figure
in 1963 to over $1 billion in 1968.75 At the time of the boom in
insurance coverage, director liability rules were in flux. In 1968, nyo
important decisions held directors and officers liable for violating
federal securities laws.76 These decisions were thought to herald a
new era of D&O liability, where even defendants who had not
personally profited from the transactions could be held liable.n
72. According to one account, the average time to settle a D&O claim is 6.6
years. Scheibla, supra note 46, at 38. The average claim age in the Wyatt Surveys
ranged from 4 to 5 years.
73. Priest, supra note 7, at 1523. Su also U.S. Dep't of Justice, Report of
the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of
the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability 60·75 (1986).
74. Diehlmann, Stahl & Wallace, Insurana, reprinted in PROTECTINC THE COR-
PORATE OFFICER AND DIRECTOR FROM LIABILITY 89, 193-94 (2d ed. 1971); A Shitld
Against Stockholder Suits, Bus. Wk., July 2, 1966, at 56.
75. 77ze Law: Trouble for the Top, Forbes, Sept. 1, 1968, at 23.
76. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), uri. dtnitd,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
77. Su, e.g., Memorandum of Machinery and Allied Products Institute, Di-
rectors' and Officers' Liability Insurance . . . Some Management Considerations
at 5-6 (1969); 77ze Law: Trouble for the Top, supra note 75, at 22-23, 27, 29, 32;
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The projections by commentators concerning the sweep of Texas
Gulf Sulphur proved to be accurate: in succeeding years, D&O liability
was expanded under the federal securities laws, largely through suits
extending the coverage of rule 10b-5 under section 1O(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Barchris, on the other hand, re-
mained more an "instructive cautionary tale"78 than a progenitor
of increased liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
In addition, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for class actions
were liberalized in 1966, and courts extended that approach by
interpreting the rules sympathetically to plaintiffs in securities cases,
further facilitating claims against directors. 79 While D&O premiums
rose with the increasing liability risk,80 the increase was not as steep
as that of the 1980s, and the market was apparently not perceived
to be in a state of crisis.
The trend of expanding liability was reversed, however, by the
mid-1970s with a line of Supreme Court rulings cutting back the
reach of the federal securities laws.81 In addition, federal courts
became less accommodating to class action and derivative suits.82
This contraction in the scope of D&O liability under the securities
laws has shown few signs of abatement in the 1980s.83
Johnston, Directors' and Officers' and Related Forms of Liability Insurance, reprinted in 5
SECURITIES LAW TECHNIQUES: TRANSACTIONS, LITIGATION 122-1, -5 (1988) (growth
of demand for D&O insurance due to litigation explosion beginning in 1960s with
expansion of class action remedies, liberalization of class action rules, increased
SEC enforcement, and proliferation of damage actions after Texas Gulf Sulphur
decision). A second important and concurrent development that also led to the
increase in insured firms was the heightened competition caused by the entrance
of American companies into the previously London-dominated market. Stahl, supra
note 55, at 156.
78. The phrase is Robert Clark's. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 746 (1986).
79. Lerach & Weiss, supra note 52, at 145, 171.
80. Knepper, Defense Memo, Liability Insurance for Corporate Directors and Officers,
13 FOR THE DEFENSE 5, 6 Gan. 1972); Diehlmann, Stahl & Wallace, supra note
74, at 124-26.
81. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (claims alleging
breach of fiduciary duty or unfairness not actionable under federal securities laws);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (scienter requirement for
liability for damages under rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (standing restricted to actual purchasers or sellers).
82. For example, courts read the federal procedural rules more restrictively
against plaintiffs, as in the adoption of a strict fraud pleading requirement. Lerach
& Weiss, supra note 52, at 171-76.
83. E.g., Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (scienter required
for 14(e) violation, which involves takeover litigation); Lerach & Weiss, supra note
52, at 177-83 (detailing decisions chilling derivative and class actions in federal
courts in the 1980s).
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State fiduciary doctrines have also experienced little change
during the past two decades. If there has been any doctrinal move-
ment at the state level, it has also been to contract the scope of
liability. For example, at the turn of the century, self-interested
transactions were voidable at will by shareholders, regardless of the
term;;. But by 1910, self-interested transactions were generally valid
unless a court found them unfair. Statutes enacted in virtually all
the states since the 1960s prescribe procedures, such as the informed
approval of a disinterested board, that can preclude a fairness re-
view.8{ In addition, the business judgment rule, which gives directors
who are informed and act in good faith the benefit of the doubt for
their decisions, has been steadfastly applied in duty of care cases.8S
Further, in a recent innovation, special litigation committees, which
are appointed by the board, have been permitted to terminate de-
rivative suits.86
The one important case arguably ex-panding directors' liability
for negligence over the past two decades, Smith v. Van Gorkom,37 in
which the Delaware Supreme Court found directors grossly negligent
in accepting a bid for their firm, was decided in 1985 after the
insurance crisis was well under way. The business judgment rule
was not rejected in Van Gorkom but was held inoperative because the
directors were found to have not properly informed themselves con-
84. CLARK, supra note 78, at 160.
85. Delaware courts have recently modified the burden of proof of the business
judgment rule for cases involving management's use of defensive tactics to thwart
hostile takeovers. To be able to maintain the presumption of good faith against the
plaintiff, the defending board must first show that its actions were reasonable in
relation to the threat posed by the bidder. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). This nuance of difference has proved easy for
boards to satisfy. The only maJor case in which a board has failed to meet the
burden involved approval of a lockup favoring the incumbent management's com-
peting bid, a transaction in the self-interest of board members besides the defendants,
and of associates of the defendants. Su Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). This crucial factor, a self-interested transaction
approved or permitted by independent directors, has been present in all of the very
rare cases in which directors have ever been held liable under the ordinary operation
of the business judgment rule and the duty of care. Su, e.g., Phillips, Principfu oj
Corporate GoVeTnaTlU: A Critique oj Part IV, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 653, 692-98
(1984).
86. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.
2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S. 2d 920 (N.Y. 1979). Delaware allows greater
judicial review of the decision of such committees than other stales. &e Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
87. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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cerning the firm's value. The court further indicated that if specific
procedures had been followed, such as obtaining an investment bank-
er's fairness opinion, there would have been no liability.88 Given
such a procedural safe harbor, which is not wildly in conflict with
standard business practice, the opinion is not a scandalous harbinger
of increased exposure. Quite to the contrary, the decision arguably
lowered the standard of conduct by defining breaches of the duty of
care in terms of "gross" rather than "ordinary" negligence.89
Changing the liability standard is not, however, the sole method
by which a legal system can produce uncertainty and thereby disrupt
insurance markets by making loss prediction difficult. The application
of a liability standard can also be a source of uncertainty. When
there is uncertainty over the standard-that is, when there is a
changing standard-setded law that did not previously create a li-
ability might now do so. When there is uncertainty over how a
standard is applied, the problem is just as severe for affected parties
as in the case of a changing standard because it is equally difficult
to predict what a court will do. Moreover, an environment of ex-
tensive transactional innovation can produce serious doctrinal un-
certainty even though the relevant liability standard has not changed,
for the outcomes of the many cases of first impression generated by
the novel transactions will be particularly difficult to predict when
the application of a standard is in flux.
The Van Gorkom decision illustrates how uncertainty in the legal
system can take different forms. There was a strong, critical reaction
to the decision by boards, commentators and the Delaware legisla-
ture.90 Yet, as discussed earlier, it is quite plausible to maintain that
the decision did not alter any substantive liability rule. In fact, the
focus of debate among commentators concerned how the law had
been applied, and not the location of the standard of care: did the
facts evidence gross negligence by the board or ordinary negligence
that in the past was found to constitute nonnegligent behavior? The
88. /d. at 881.
89. /d. at 889.
90. E.g., Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1437, 1453-55 (1985); Schatz, Focus on Corporate Boards: Directors Feel the Legal
Heat, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1985, at F12, col. 3 (Van Gorkom a "topic of fervent
discussion among directors"); Note, 1986 Ohio Corporation Amendments: Expanding the
Scope of Director Immunity, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 667·68 (1987) (Delaware statute
permitting shareholders to eliminate directors' liability for monetary damages for
negligence was a legislative reaction to Van Gorkom).
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reaction to Van Gorkom suggests the decision created uncertainty
concerning how the liability standard would be applied. The effect
on litigants is the same as that of an uncertain standard, difficulty
in predicting case outcomes. Corporate practice, in recent years, has
been characterized oy rapid-paced innovation in the structuring of
peals, and new claims, such as objections to the latest takeover
defensive tactic, are continually being brought against directors.
Because litigation in this environment will inevitably raise numerous
complex issues involving application of the liability standard, the
variance of the standard \vill increase, making D&O losses more
difficult to predict. An increase in uncertainty should not be of
moment to insurers, who, unlike insureds, are risk neutral and
concerned with an increase in the expected value of a loss rather
than an increase in its variability. However, this type of legal un-
certainty affects all insureds and thereby creates a dependence across
D&O risks, vitiating the applicability of the law of large numbers
to D&O policies' pricing. The upshot of this phenomenon is that
the increased uncertainty in D&O risk assessment can cause rates
to rise even though the apparent core of the standard of conduct
has remained the same.
2. Insurance Contract Construction
The problem confronting D&O insurers in assessing the risks
of unanticipated, novel lawsuits is exacerbated by court rulings on
insurance contracts which are all too often, to be blunt, lawless. In
their reading of D&O insurance contracts, courts frequently rewrite
the allocation of risk against the insurer. Insurers have had, for
example, to pay defense costs as incurred, even though the action
may not be covered by the policy, the insured refuses to respect the
insurer's reservation of rights, and the policy explicitly gives the
insurer the option to make defense advances.91 Insurers have not
been permitted to litigate the applicability of the dishonesty exclusion
when the underlying action has been settled without an adjudication
of guilt.92 They have also not been permitted to exercise their can-
cellation rights when the insured is bankrupt.93 Related transactions
91. Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corp., 795 F.2d 1450 (9lh Cir. 1986); Pepsico,
Inc. v. Contip.ental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
92. Pepsico, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 640 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
93. Minoco Group v. First State Underwriters Agency, 799 F.2d 517 (9th
Cir. 1986).
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have been found to constitute "separate loss occurrences," increasing
the liability of the insurer,94 and knowing misrepresentations in fi-
nancial statements have been held not to void policies because the
documents were not explicitly incorporated by reference in the policy
application's cognizance warranty.95 In addition, insurers have been
held liable for losses atlsing from suits involving an outside direc-
torship-an insured individual serving on the board of a company
different from the insured corporation-when the policy was silent
on the issue.96 The two notable decisions favorable to insurers have
permitted the voiding of a policy as to all insureds when there has
been a material misrepresentation in the application process.97
Courts have also construed D&O policies as placing the risk of
all new perils on insurers. The recent spate of cases in which banks
have directly sued officers and directors for negligently approving
what with hindsight were bad loans, in order to recover upon the
D&O insurance policy, illustrates this tendency.98 Such claims could
not have been anticipated by insurers because a corporation suing
its employees for negligence was theretofore unthinkable. Yet in
National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Seafirst Corp. ,99 the court cavalierly
rejected the insurer's contention that its D&O policy was not intended
to cover such a claim by citing the policy language that the insurer
would pay losses suffered as a result of "any" claims against directors.
The corporate strategy followed in the bank cases, when suc-
cessful, converts what is priced as third-party insurance into first-
party insurance, because the corporation can trigger a payment to
itself by suing its employees. A corporation suing its own employees
has access to far more records and information than the typical
shareholder-plaintiff, making a defense more difficult. loo The action
94-. Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corp., 795 F.2d 14-50 (9th Cir. 1986); North
River Ins. Co. v. Huff, 628 F. Supp. 1129 (D. Kan. 1985).
95. Federal Ins. Co. v. Oak Indus., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 192,519 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 1986); National Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Continental Ill. Corp., 673 F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
96. Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. Johnson, 4-91 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 64-1 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1981).
97. Shapiro v. American Home Assurance Co., 584- F. Supp. 124-5 (D. Mass.
1984-); Bird v. Penn Central Co., 34-1 F. Supp. 291 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
98. E.g., Complaint in Bank of Am. v. Powers, No. C 536·776 (Cal. Super.
Ct. fIled Mar. 1, 1985), reprinted in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE
AND SELF INSURANCE 115, 116 (1986).
99. No. C85-396R (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19, 1986), reprinted in DIRECTORS' AND
OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 1987, at 307 (1987).
100. See Labich, Showdown Over Insuring Corporate Officers, Fortune, Dec. 9, 1985,
at 70.
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shifts the cumulative probability distribution of losses to the right;
the probability of a loss-that is, of the plaintiff's success-is higher
than before at every point. Moreover, the liability on such claims
has been substantial: Chase Manhattan settled a $175 million claim
for $32.5 million covered by insurance; Bank of America settled a
$95 million claim for an $8.2 million payment from insurers; and
Seafirst Corporation entered into a $110 million settlement with its
directors and officers limiting recovery to its $70 million remaining
policy limits. 101 The inevitable consequence of such litigation is higher
insurance premiums.
This judicial approach to D&O insurance contracts also magnifies
moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Liability arising out
of novel D&O litigation is being borne by the insurer although the
insured is often better informed about such risks and some of these
risks are within the insured's control. This situation may be one of
the reasons for the rise in policyholder-formed insurers: the adverse
selection and moral hazard problems created by the information
asymmetry between insured and insurer will obviously be remedied
if the insured becomes the insurer. It is plausible, in this context,
to anticipate that policyholder-formed insurance groups could screen
members more effectively than commercial insurers.
The Seafirst decision may simply be an example of special judicial
solicitude for banks and their customers, an inclination that has been
exhibited in corporate law decisions on directors' liability for neg-
ligence. 102 Insurance companies have not, however, viewed the de-
101. !d. (Chase Manhattan settlement); BankAmmca's &llkmtnls, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 5, 1988, at D4, col. 5. See also National Union Fire Ins. v. SeaftrSt Corp.,
662 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (the primary insurer paid $15 million in
addition to paying $5 million in defense costs, while the excess insurer is contesting
paying its $55 million share). Bank of America settled related shareholder litigation
with payments from its D&O insurers totaling $60.4 million. Waldman, BmkAmerita
Settles Suits Tied to Losses, Posts Gain on Sak of BaM-Finn Slak, Wall St. J., Jan. 5,
1988, at 12, col. 2.
102. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Daoy Ducks: Ntw Trtnds in Ik Jndtmnifitalian
of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095·96 (1968). Of course,
given the existence of federal deposit insurance, current concerns for bank depositors
are superfluous, except to the e.xtent that any recovery reduces the costs of operating
the insurance system and therefore reduces the depositor's costs. In suppon of
applying a higher standard of conduct to bank directors, it should be noted that
shareholders in financial corporations may have need for greater protection than
shareholders in manufacturing firms, because the liquidity, and hence rcdeployu-
bility, of the corporate assets may make misappropriation of assets by management
easier to undenake, yet far harder to detect.
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clslOn as a ruling limited to banks. Many new D&O policies, of
both nonfinancial and financial corporations, include an exclusion
for lawsuits brought by one insured against another insured, as
insurers seek to limit their exposure under Seaf£rst. 103 This reaction
by insurers exemplifies George Priest's thesis that insurers use ex-
clusions to control adverse selection problems produced by court
decisions expanding liability, and that the decisions, which are in-
tended to compensate victims more fully, tend to have the opposite
effect. 104 This is because the solution D&O insurers implemented to
eliminate the exposure of Seafirst is not precisely tailored to the
problem and has thus resulted in a decrease in available insurance.
The typical wording of the new insured exclusion is broad, applying
as well to what are ordinarily considered to be legitimately insurable
losses, such as derivative suits and suits brought by a terminated
officer who feels wronged by the board. lOS The failure of a policy to
cover derivative suits particularly limits its value because indemni-
fication is generally not permitted for payments in those suits. This
means that not only will recoveries by future plaintiffs be smaller
but there will also be fewer of them because they are typically paid
only out of insurance proceeds. 106
Decisions such as Seafirst further contribute to the insurance
crisis by placing insurers in a dilemma. Insurers may not be able
103. In 1987, 41 % of bank, financial and leasing company D&O policies
contained such a provision, which is substantially higher than the survey average
of 29 %, but several other industries were not far behind the banks: publishing and
communications, 38%; petroleum, 38%; construction and real estate, 38%; utilities
34%. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 73.
104. Priest, supra note 7, at 1574-75. The source of the judicial problem in
D&O liability, however, is not a change in substantive doctrine as in Priest's context
of general tort liability, but rather it is a matter of insurance contract construction.
105. 1987 Wyatt Survey, supra note 4, at 69. A small number of policies (3%)
attempt to remedy this problem by excepting derivative suits from the exclusion.
!d. at 39. There is, however, no easy solution to the drafting quagmire. If the
corporation does not take direct action against directors and officers, a shareholder
can bring a derivative suit and the corporation need not vigorously oppose its
prosecution. Cf National Union Ins. v. Seafirst Corp., 662 F. Supp. 36 (W.D.
Wash. 1986) (insurer challenging bank's "collusive" settlement of derivative suit).
106. Settlements may even expressly limit the plaintiffs' recovery to amounts
equal to the corporation's D&O policies' limits, and some even provide for payment
only to the extent the company recovers on its policies. There are numerous
incentives for plaintiffs, as well as defendants, to settle and make the insurer pay.
See Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation,
48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985) (thorough discussion of the strong incentives
to settle in derivative litigation).
HeinOnline -- 14 Del. J. Corp. L. 29 1989
1989] DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE 29
to delimit their exposure by writing more detailed policies that specify
what risks are covered because courts typically construe exclusions
narrowly just as they construe coverage provisions broadly. The
judicial provision of a safety net for insureds is a well intentioned,
but misguided use of the insurance law maxim that ambiguity in a
contract is construed against the drafter. l07 This rule of construction
is sensible when the contract is a standard form and the party who
drafted it has superior and cheaper access to information. However,
these concerns are not present in the D&O context where the pur-
chasing corporations employ professional brokers to negotiate par-
ticularized policies, and the contracting parties are both sophisticated
enterprises. 108 It is ironic that the behavioral effect of the decisions
is not necessarily an expansion of coverage, as the courts intend,
but rather, a contraction, for they leave negotiators with fewer bar-
gaining points with which to facilitate the crafting of mutually ac-
ceptable contracts.
Although creative judicial interpretation of insurance contracts
is not a new phenomenon,l09 until the mid-1980s there were very
few cases involving D&O policies, since insurers rarely litigated D&O
contract disputes. While the new litigiousness may be a function of
new players in the market for D&O insurance, it is also possible
that the increased litigation is connected to the insurance crisis: that
is, the insurance contract litigation may be contributing to the crisis.
When courts rewrite an insurance contract, the price insurers received
will not have been commensurate with the risk they actually bore.
Higher premiums are necessary on new policies, with terms identical
to older, cheaper policies, to compensate the insurer for the court-
added risk. To the extent that the losses are within the insured's
control, as in the Seafirst case, or are correlated across insureds because
of general economic factors affecting all businesses, the new risks
107. Ostrager & Iehel, Rules oj ConstTlJ£tion A.ffating Business Insurance Policies,
reprinted in DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE AND SELF INSURANCE 359
(1986). This doctrine is typically used in the opinions discussed throughout the text
as favoring insureds. See supra text accompanying notes 92-97 & 99-100.
108. There have been a few exceptions to the doctrine's use to support the
claims of the insured in the business insurance conte.xt, but the cases t)'Picall)'
involve provisions specially drafted by the insured, so the doctrine could straight-
forwardly be applied in the insurer's favor. Ostrager & lehel, The Role oj Bargaining
Power Evidence in the ConstTlJ£tion oj the Business Insurance Policy: An Update, 18 FORUM
577, 580-81 (1983).
109. E.g., Horvitz, Handling Defense ApptIlls in Light oj Expanding Con((pls of
Liability, 16 FOR THE DEFENSE 105 (Sept. 1975).
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being placed on insurers may be so difficult to assess as to be
uninsurable, which could lead insurers to withdraw from the mar-
ket. IIO
3. State Efforts at Easing the Crisis
By 1987, approximately the same time as the insurance market
had begun to stabilize, thirty-five states, including those with the
greatest number of corporations listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change, had modified their corporation codes to reduce the financial
exposure of directors and officers for shareholder claims. Statutes
limiting liability have taken three general approaches. The most
popular approach, adopted by thirty states, is to permit shareholder-
approved charter amendments eliminating or limiting directors' li-
ability for monetary damages for negligence. II I The second most
popular strategy, chosen by four states, is to raise the culpability
standard for directors' liability for damages to require willful mis-
conduct or recklessness, thereby eliminating liability for negligence. 1I2
110. See Winter, supra note 58 (formal model of capacity constraints in the
context of increasing legal uncertainty (that is, dependent risk) and an imperfect
capital market).
111. The Delaware statute, the model for the other 29 states, was intended
to ease the insurance crisis by permitting firms to eliminate liability for acts that
were typically covered by D&O insurance. S. 533 Synopsis, 133rd Gen. Assembly,
at 2 (1986). The states with this type of statute are: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-
004.A.17, 10-054.A.9 (Supp. 1988); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-202.B.3 (Supp. 1989);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(10) (West Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-3-101(1)(u)
(Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 14-2-171(b)(3)(A) (Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-54(2) (Supp. 1988); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 496A,49.13 (West Supp. 1988); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8)
(Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24-C(4) (West Supp. 1989); MD. CORPS.
& ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-104(8) (Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B,
§ 13(b)(11/2) (Supp. 1988); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(209)(c) (Callaghan Supp.
1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(4) (West Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-202(2)(a)(v) (Supp. 1987); Act of March 18, 1987, ch. 28, 1987 Nev. Stat.
80; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53·12-
2-E (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-7(11) (Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1006(B)(7) (West
Supp. 1989); ORE. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.047(2)(c) (1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8364(a) (Purdon 1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-48(a)(6) (Supp. 1988); Act
effective June 21, 1987, No. 282, 1987 S.D. Laws 13; TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-
102(b)(3) (1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-7.06 (Vernon Supp. 1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.12.020
(Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-202(c) (1987).
112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1645 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Burns
1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59D (Page Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.307(1) (West Supp. 1988).
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The third approach, promoted by the American Law Institute and
adopted by one state, is to set a statutory limit to directors' and
officers' monetary liability for negligence and to permit shareholders
to specify a damages limit in the corporate charter or bylaws.113
In addition to the strategy of reducing liability, several states
have expanded directors' and officers' indemnification. This has been
achieved by eliminating the traditional distinction benveen third party
and derivative suits;l1~ expressly permitting corporations to provide
greater indemnification rights to their directors and officers by con-
tract;1l5 altering the procedural presumption concerning requests for
indemnification so as to favor the individual director or officer;116
and expressly authorizing advance payments of litigation expenses. 117
Another corporation law innovation, sometimes enacted at the same
time as limited liability statutes, is a provision permitting directors
to consider nonshareholder interests. liB These provisions are primarily
directed at aiding management's ability to oppose corporate takeovers
without liability to shareholders for loss of the bid premium. By
increasing the insulation of the board's decisions, they serve to limit
liability.
Insurers did not respond to the enactment of these statutes by
reducing 1987 policy rates, although many firms acted immediately
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1988). The statutory limit is the
greater of $100,000 or the individual's cash compensation from the corporation
received over the 12 months preceding the act or omission for which liability was
imposed. The American Law Institute's proposal would limit liability to an amount
"not disproportionate" to the individual's compensation for services during the
year of the violation. American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance:
Analysis and Recommendations, T.D. No.7, part VII, ch. I, § 7.17 (Apr. 10,
1987).
114. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.355(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
115. E.g., id. § 351.355(7).
116. E.g., Mo. CORPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418(b)(1) (Supp. 1988).
117. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (Supp. 1988).
118. Eight states have such provisions, although not all were passed in response
to the insurance crisis: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1988) (effective Aug. 23, 1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns 1989)
(effective Apr. I, 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347.1 (Vemon Supp. 1989) (applies
to board's exercise of business judgment concerning acquisitions only) (effective
May 6, 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35.D (Supp. 1988) (effective Apr. 9,
1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989) (effective July 23,
1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (page Supp. 1987) (effective Apr. I,
1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon 1988) (effective Jan. 28, 1987);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (West Supp. 1988) (effective June 12, 1987).
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to amend their charters. 119 For a number of reasons, it is problematic
whether the many firms opting into the limited liability statutes will
ever see lower premiums. First, a large number of claims, such as
those alleging violations of federal securities laws or breaches of the
duty of loyalty, cannot be eliminated under the statutes. Second,
the statutes permit directors, but not officers, to be exempted from
liability. Finally, plaintiffs will, in all likelihood, be able to redraft
their complaints to continue to bring lawsuits; for example, instead
of alleging negligence they will allege reckless behavior.120 Of course,
the key actor is the judiciary, for plaintiffs' strategies can succeed
only if courts are willing to characterize negligent behavior as in-
tentional misconduct to avoid the liability limitations. Accordirlgly,
although the recent legislative reforms have the potential for easing
the insurance crisis by reducing the number of claims in one of the
more costly claim categories, the effect of the statutes on insurance
may well be minimal.
IV. CONCLUSION
We do not have a satisfactory understanding of the cause of the
D&O insurance crisis. But one does not have to dig very deep to
conclude that any satisfactory explanation will be multicausal. This
article has sought to identify some of those causal factors. In the.
1980s, unexpected and undesired exposure was increasingly placed
on insurers by economic conditions increasing the number of bank-
ruptcies, acquisitions and public offerings, which shifted the under-
lying D&O liability risk, and by judicial decisions altering the
contractual allocation of that risk. These factors aggravated the dif·
ficulty of loss prediction in the D&O line, thereby decreasing its
profitability. At the same time, interest rates were falling and world-
wide reinsurance markets were contracting, which further restricted
D&O insurers' flexibility. One of the few clear policy recommen·
dations in this murky area is for courts to enforce D&O insurance
contracts. The judicial reallocation of risk in D&O insurance contracts
is the most controllable factor in the confluence of factors that are
• !
119. In a random sample of 100 Delaware corporations, I found that 90 had
adopted charter amendments eliminating directors' liability under DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988), within one year of its enactment.
120. One commentator suggests that the lack of opposition to the new statutes
by the plaintiffs' bar is evidence that the statutes will not substantially inhibit future
claims (or at least evidence of the bar's belief that there will ,be no effect). Smith,
D&O Liability Crisis: Good News, Bad News, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1987, at 6.
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likely to have produced the insurance crisis that staggered the D&O
consumer in the mid-1980s.
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